Public choice

  1. Rationality postulate
  2. Methodological individualism
  3. Politics as exchange

The economics of conflict

 \(p_i,\ i\in\left\{1,\ 2\right\}\)
\(p_1=1-p_2\)
\(p_1=\frac{n_1}{n_1+n_2},\ p_2=\frac{n_2}{n_1+n_2}\)
Max \(p_i\Theta-cn_i\)

The paradox of revolution

Revolution as a collective action problem

Tullock's model

\(P_r=P_g\cdot\left(L_v+L_i\right)+R_i\left(L_v+L_i\right)-P_i\left[1-\left(L_v+L_i\right)\right]-L_w\cdot I_r+E\)
\(P_r\simeq P_gL_v+R_iL_v-P_i\left(1-L_v\right)-L_wI_r+E\)
\(G_r\simeq R_iL_v-P_i\left(1-L_v\right)-L_wI_r+E\)

Implications of the model