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\begin{document}

\title[Digital Traces of the Predatory Landlord - FINAL REPORT]{Digital Traces of the Predatory Landlord - FINAL REPORT}

\author[Jack Lundquist \textit{et~al}]{Jack Lundquist\,$^{1}$  , Keith Dumanski\,$^{2}$ , Julian Ferreiro\,$^{3}$ , Yixuan Tang\,$^{4}$}


\address{$^{1}$NYU Center for Urban Science \& Progress\\
$^{2}$Keith Dumanski
$^{3}$Julian Ferreiro
$^{4}$Yixuan Tang}


\maketitle

\selectlanguage{english}
\begin{abstract}
Approximately 70 percent of New York City residents rent the place they call home, making landlords of residential properties some of the most influential people in the lives of New Yorkers. A variety of high profile instances of illegal and harmful landlord practices, particularly around illegal and coercive actions taken to push tenants of rent stabilized units out in order to create a larger return on these units. These cases and the public outcry around them motivate further exploration into the question of how to better identify and prosecute landlords engaging in illegal behavior. Based on an original typology of predatory landlord behaviors, our team presents a set of methods to identify this behavior across a variety of datasets. The scale of this analytic work has never been tackled before, and can substantially improve the way  illegal landlord activity is discovered, prosecuted and regulated.%
\end{abstract}%


\selectlanguage{english}
\begin{figure}[h!]
\begin{center}
\includegraphics[width=33]{figures/download/download}

\end{center}
\end{figure}

\section{Introduction}


The use of data to support the holding accountable of predatory
landlords is, so far, limited. Many of the existing uses are not
publicly available, and many are not done in a way that is scalable
beyond a specific building or portfolio. There have been some larger
scale, public and data-driven efforts to quantify the quality of housing
for New York City residents, but these efforts are not geared towards
holding specific landlords to account. (Rentlogic)(Displacement Alert
Pr\ldots{}){Our team is looking to fill this gap between legal advocacy
and data-driven work. Based on a model of predatory landlord behavior,
we identify indicators in public and private data sources that point to
the systematic and illegal harassment of tenants by New York City's
landlords. This comprehensive set of methods can help bring rigor and
extensive coverage to the investigation of landlords. The case studies
we present in this paper demonstrate~this, while also showing the unique
nature of each landlord's portfolio and set of suspected predatory
tactics. Ultimately, while it is not possible to use data to prove
definitively that landlords are engaging in illegal behavior aimed at
harassing tenants, the set of methods presented in this paper, when
applied together, can paint a damning picture of a landlord by showing
they are likely engaged in a plethora of predatory actions throughout
the property ownership cycle.}

\section{Data Sources}

A variety of data sources from New York City's open data portal were
used. One private dataset was made available to us by StreetEasy. A full
list can be found in the ``Figures'' document.

\par\null\selectlanguage{english}
\begin{table}[h!]
\centering
\large\begin{tabulary}{1.0\textwidth}{CCC}
Indicator & Description & Intimidation Category \\
Average Renovation Index Score & A higher mean score indicates the presence of buildings in gentrifying neighborhoods, creating a stronger incentive to deregulate rent stabilized units to rent at high and increasing market rates. & Neighborhood Characteristics \\
\% of units in portfolio that are rent stabilized & If more units in the building are rent stabilized, more financial opportunity exists to be gained through the conversion of these units to market rate. & Building Characteristics \\
Change in rent stabilized units between 2007 and 2016 & If the percent change is substantial, a landlord may have already seized upon the financial opportunity described above. & Building Characteristics \\
\% of buildings in portfolio in set of flagged streeteasy listings & Buildings are advertised with language like "value add," "high upside," and "upside potential" as a signal to predatory equity investors. & Building Characteristics \\
Buildings in portfolio with a loan underwritten by a bank known to work with predatory equity investors & Using a list provided by the Public Advocate for NYC of banks that loan the most to landlords on their "Worst Landlords Watchlist" of 2017, the presence of these banks on loan sheets may indicate a predatory equity investment. & Relationship to banks identified as bad actors \\
\% of buildings with construction complaints more than one standard deviation above city average & A large portion of buildings with a high outlying amount of construction complaints may indicate the use of construction as a systematic tactic for tenant harassment. & Construction-as-harassment \\
\% of buildings with top 5 over-represented complaints in Kushner + Croman portfolios more than one standard deviation above city average & A large portion of buildings with a high outlying amount of complaints over-represented in the Kushner + Croman portfolios (compared to the city-wide baseline) may indicate a similarity to known bad actors in terms of construction-related tactics for harassment. & Construction-as-harassment \\
Evictions per unit in portfolio & A high amount of evictions per unit may indicate the use of evictions as a tactic for tenant harassment and unit deregulation. & Evictions \\
\% of buildings with at least one eviction & A high amount of buildings with evictions may indicate the use of evictions as a systematic, portfolio-wide tactic for tenant harassment and unit deregulation. & Evictions \\
\% of buildings in portfolio suspected of engaging in illegal deregulation through the misreporting of rent stabilized units & A large portion of buildings suspected of under-reporting the number of rent stabilized units may indicate the use of misreporting to illegally deregulate rent stabilized units. & Illegal Deregulation \\
\end{tabulary}
\caption{{\textbf{Data Sources}
{\label{882782}}%
}}
\end{table}\section{Methods}


\subsection{Entity Resolution}

To determine a landlord's portfolio of buildings based on a single
building or owner, our team used the
website~\url{http://whoownswhat.justfix.nyc/}.

\subsection{Process Diagram}

Based on conversations with a variety of stakeholders working on
tenant's rights in New York City, we identified 6 critical phases during
which landlords may act in a way that is harmful to their
tenants:~\textbf{property identification, building financing,
construction, building management involvement, legal proceedings, and
illegal deregulation}. While obviously not capturing all tactics of
predatory landlords, these areas of action and the behaviors described
in the process diagram below provide the foundation for an analysis of
predatory landlord behavior throughout the property ownership cycle.\selectlanguage{english}
\begin{figure}[h!]
\begin{center}
\includegraphics[width=0.70\columnwidth]{figures/ProcessDiagram-7-12-18/ProcessDiagram-7-12-18}
\caption{{Process model of landlord harassment
{\label{128333}}%
}}
\end{center}
\end{figure}

Our team generated indicators for five out of the six types, excluding
``Management Involvement'' given time constraints and concerns about the
extent these self-reported data were truly representative of building
management harassment across New York City.

\subsection{Indicators}

\textbf{Average Renovation Index Score (Neighborhood Characteristics)}

A higher mean score indicates the presence of buildings in gentrifying
neighborhoods, creating a stronger incentive to deregulate rent
stabilized units to subsequently rent at high and increasing market
rates. The baseline for comparison is the city-wide average score.

\par\null

\textbf{Percent of buildings in various neighborhood typologies defined
by the Displacement Project \textbf{(Neighborhood Characteristics)}}

The Displacement Project defines gentrification and displacement
differently than the Renovation Index, focusing more on demographic
factors rather than development-specific factors (which the Renovation
Index is focused on). The interpretation, however, is similar: more
buildings in neighborhoods identified as gentrifying result in a
stronger incentive to deregulate rent stabilized units to subsequently
rent at high and increasing market rates.~ ~~

\par\null

\textbf{Percent of units in portfolio that are rent stabilized (Building
Characteristics)}

If more units in the building are rent stabilized, there is more
financial opportunity through the conversion of these units to the
market rate. The baseline for comparison is the percent of units in the
city that are rent stabilized.

~

\textbf{Change in rent stabilized units between 2007 and 2016~ (Building
Characteristics)}

~If the percent change is substantial and negative, a landlord may have
already seized upon the financial opportunity described above. The
baseline for comparison is the change in rent stabilized units for all
buildings in New York City that had at least one rent stabilized unit in
2007.

\par\null

\textbf{Percent of buildings in set of flagged streeteasy listings
(Building Characteristics)}

According to housing rights advocates, buildings are advertised with
language like ``value add,'' ``high upside,'' and ``upside potential''
as a signal to predatory equity investors. The presence of even one
building on the list of streeteasy buildings characterized with this
language may indicate the landlord's interest in predatory equity
investments. The baseline for comparison is the percent of residential
buildings in the city appearing on the list.

~

\textbf{Buildings in portfolio with a loan underwritten by a bank known
to work with predatory equity investors (Relationship to banks
identified as bad actors)}

The presence of banks known to loan to predatory equity investors on a
loan sheets may be an indication of a predatory equity investment. Our
list of banks fitting this description was taken from the list of banks
identified by the Public Advocate for NYC as loaning most to landlords
on their ``Worst Landlords Watchlist'' of 2017 (all banks on this list
were used besides JPMorgan Chase and Capital One, the only two national
banks with assets of greater than fifty billion dollars).(PA James
Unveils the\ldots{}) The baseline for comparison is the percent of
residential buildings in NYC with one of these banks on a loan sheet.

\par\null

\textbf{Percent of buildings with construction complaints more than one
standard deviation above city average (Construction as Harassment)}

A large portion of buildings with a high outlying amount of construction
complaints may indicate the use of construction as a systematic tactic
for tenant harassment.

\par\null

\textbf{Percent of buildings with top 5 over-represented complaints in
Kushner + Croman portfolios more than one standard deviation above city
average~\textbf{(Construction as Harassment)} ~}

A large portion of buildings with a high outlying amount of complaints
over-represented in the Kushner + Croman portfolios may indicate a
similarity to these two known bad actors in terms of
construction-related tactics for harassment.

~

\textbf{Evictions per unit in portfolio~ \textbf{(Evictions)}}

\textbf{~}A high amount of evictions per unit may indicate the use of
evictions as a tactic for tenant harassment and unit deregulation. The
baseline for comparison is the total number of evictions per unit for
all residential units in New York City.

\par\null

\textbf{Percent of buildings with at least one eviction (Evictions)}

A high amount of buildings with evictions may indicate the use of
evictions as a systematic, portfolio-wide tactic for tenant harassment
and unit deregulation. The baseline for comparison is the percent of
residential buildings in New York City with at least one eviction.

\par\null

\textbf{Percent of buildings in portfolio suspected of engaging in
illegal deregulation through the misreporting of rent stabilized units
(Illegal Deregulation)}

A large portion of buildings suspected of under-reporting the number of
rent stabilized units may indicate the use of misreporting as a tactic
of illegally deregulating rent stabilized units. The baseline for
comparison is the percent of all rent stabilized buildings in NYC
suspected of engaging in illegal deregulation through misreporting. The
list of suspected buildings was generated using a pattern detection
algorithm described in Appendix A.

\par\null

These indicators are calculated in our analysis for the portfolio of a
given landlord to help facilitate a holistic understanding of a
landlord's relationship with tenants. Information about the extent of a
financial motive for deregulating units can be combined with indicators
of predatory equity to generate an intuition about whether a landlord is
a predatory equity investor focused on the deregulation of rent
stabilized units (through coercion or otherwise). And this intuition can
be synthesized with indicators showing the likelihood landlords are
engaged in various tactics of tenant intimidation to get a sense of how
landlords are treating tenants based on the financial incentives
underlying this relationship.

\par\null

To help motivate a more intuitive processing of these varied indicators,
we created a radar chart with each indicator above as one axis.
City-wide baselines are visualized together with the portfolio-specific
output to motivate an understanding of how much a portfolio is deviating
from the city-wide norms of landlord behavior.

\section{Results}

\subsection{List of Properties Suspected of Illegal Deregulation}

A tangential product of our work is a list of properties we suspect to
have engaged in the illegal deregulation of rent stabilized units
through misreporting.

\subsection{Comparative Analysis}

In order to understand how the indicators laid out in our methods
section help support an understanding of a landlord's relationship with
tenants, our team calculated these indicators for a variety of different
portfolios. These portfolios were mostly selected from the Public
Advocate's ``Landlord Watchlist,'' so there is some prior information
suggesting that the landlords of these portfolios are already known to
treat tenants poorly. We also included the portfolios of Steve Croman
and the Kushner Cos.

\par\null

The radar charts of these portfolios shown in the ``Figures'' document
suggest a wide variety of different landlord profiles. These profiles
vary in terms of the financial strategy implied and the stage of this
strategy the landlord is in, the set of actions for intimidating tenants
the data seems to suggest, and the extent to which one can reasonably
believe what is being suggested.

\par\null

The financial strategies of the portfolios examined seem to fall into a
few categories: early-stage predatory equity, late-state predatory
equity and unknown. Portfolios that seem to fit the model of a predatory
equity investment profile are those who have 40\% of buildings or more
with loans underwritten by predatory equity banks (e.g. Thomas Steiner)
and/or a substantial number of buildings in the portfolio on the list of
properties flagged as being advertised as predatory equity investments
(e.g. Silvershore Properties). Portfolios in the earlier stages (e.g.
Meir Fried) have more rent stabilized units in their portfolios and less
of a decline in the amount of rent stabilized units, whereas portfolios
in the later stages have seen more of a decline and therefore have less
rent stabilized units (e.g. Steve Croman). A portfolio like Deodat
Lowtan's does show a precipitous decline in rent stabilized units, but
our indicators of predatory equity do not present evidence he is engaged
in such a financial scheme. However, it could be the case that further
research would demonstrate the presence of such a financial incentive
underlying this change in rent stabilized units, as could also be the
case that further research would confound the characterizations of early
or late stage predatory implied by this research. The intuition
presented here is just that: an intuition, to be supported or confounded
by further research.

\par\null

Our indicators measure three types of actions landlords take to
intimidate tenants, often to coerce them into leaving rent stabilized
units: construction as harassment, evictions without just cause, and
illegal deregulation through the misreporting of rent stabilized units.
Some landlords (e.g. Deodat Lowtan) seem to engage in all three
practices, some in just two (e.g. Kushner Cos), and some only one (e.g.
Joel Goldstein). As is the case with the indicators of predatory equity,
these intuitive interpretations need to be verified with further
research. Nonetheless, the variance both in terms of actions directly
impacting tenants and the financial schemes motivating these actions
demonstrate the power of our analytic framework to help begin
characterizing landlords by their bad behavior, thereby supporting a
more specific and effective approach to the regulation, investigation
and prosecution of landlords.

\subsection{Portfolio Analysis Tool}

In addition to the specific portfolios our team examined, we also
created a set of scripts that allow interested parties to generate a
profile of any landlord's portfolio they are interested in
investigating. This profile contains all the indicators described in the
methods section besides the Streeteasy indicator, as the data provided
to enable that analysis is not publicly available.

\section{Conclusion}

The harassment of tenants, particularly socially vulnerable tenants in
rent stabilized units, is a critical issue in New York City. A
significant amount of work is being done by regulatory agencies,
non-profit organizations and community activists to combat predatory
landlords and protect tenants, but much of this work is being done on a
building by building or portfolio by portfolio basis. Given the scope
and magnitude of this problem, an approach for identifying and
characterizing predatory landlords that can scale to portfolios across
New York City is needed. The methodology, analysis and tool our team
have presented in this paper form the foundation for such an approach.
The technical and institutional challenges necessary to implement such
an approach at scale are substantial. On the technical side, a more
robust data validation would be needed to ensure the representativeness
of the self-reported data. Further testing based on a larger and more
detailed training set of known bad landlords should be incorporated to
validate and refine the indicators proposed here. And to truly scale
this approach, our tool must be automated and all portfolios in New York
City must be queried to facilitate real-time and city-wide use. On the
organizational side, there is the major challenge of incorporating of a
city-wide, portfolio scale tool for the flagging of landlords suspected
of rental intimidation into the city's existing regulatory processes,
many of which at the building level and many of which already facing
substantial backlogs. And given the highly politicized nature of the
real estate sector in New York City it may be hard to find the
willingness to invest in a tool targeting landlords, even if they are
landlords who harass their tenants. However, the resolution of these
issues and the implementation of such a tool would result in a
substantial improvement in the way regulators and community activists go
about identifying, characterizing and ultimately holding accountable New
York City's predatory landlords.

~

\section{Appendix A: Illegal Deregulation Analysis}

As discussed in the body of this paper, landlords such as Kushner
Companies have historically under-reported the amount of rent stabilized
units in their buildings on building permit applications. This practice
allows landlords to complete construction jobs without the oversight
from DOB required for rent stabilized apartments to ensure that
construction is not being used to harass tenants out of their
apartments. In the longer term, it may also allow landlords to illegally
deregulate units simply by lying about the rent stabilized status of a
unit. This would allow landlords to raise rents and remove tenants more
easily.(Allegations that Kush\ldots{})

\par\null

In order to identify buildings where illegal deregulation and the
misreporting of rent stabilized units occured, our team employed a
simple pattern recognition algorithm on the list of all buildings that
at any point in time had rent stabilized units, according to nyc-db's
count of rent stabilized units. The theory underlying this analysis was
that the practice of misreporting follows a similar pattern in the data:
a non-zero rent stabilized unit count for one or multiple years,
followed by a rent stabilized unit count of zero for one or multiple
year, then followed by a non-zero rent stabilized unit count for one or
multiple years. This pattern is distinct from that of standard
deregulation (both resulting from natural flows in and out of units and
from landlord harassment) in that there is a decline to zero followed by
an increase to a non-zero count of units. While there is a chance that
this is because the building received some subsidy in exchange for
increasing the amount of rent stabilized units, it is more likely that
the count of zero is the result of misreporting.

\par\null

To find buildings following this pattern, the rent stabilized unit
counts for all rent stabilized buildings were converted from separate
yearly columns into one string per building. This string was in
chronological order (e.g. the first character was the unit count from
2007 and the last was the unit count from 2016), and each character was
either an ``N'' (non-zero) or ``0'' (zero). A list of strings denoting
the nonzero-zero-nonzero pattern was generated (e.g. {[}N0N, N00N,
N000N, \ldots{}{]}) and each building's full string was checked against
this list to see whether it contained one of the strings in the list.
Those that did were flagged as potentially having misreported their unit
counts.

\par\null

There are two limitations of note with this approach. First, as
mentioned above it may be the case that the increase from zero to some
non-zero amount of rent stabilized units could be the result of
something other than the illegal deregulation of a unit: the terms of
some subsidy received may demand rent stabilized units, for example. To
determine whether or not this may be the case, our team merged a list of
properties receiving housing subsidies from the Furman
Center(CoreData.nyc - Furman\ldots{}) and the list of misreporting
buildings generated through our analysis. Only five percent of buildings
suspected of misreporting the number of rent stabilized units receive
subsidies, meaning that subsidies can be ruled out as a reason for a
zero to non-zero change in at least ninety five percent of buildings
suspected of misreporting.~ ~

\par\null

The second limitation is that there may be instances where the number of
rent stabilized units could be misreported but not misreported as zero
rent stabilized units. The approach we adopt will not capture these
records. However, it is reasonable to assume that misreporting will
almost always occur as zero units, given that a key motivation for
misreporting is to not trigger a building inspection. If a landlord
misreported the stabilized unit count above zero, then the building
inspection would still be triggered. This means that, while hard to
verify, it seems likely that most misreporting of rent stabilized unit
counts will misreport the number as zero.

\par\null

While this list is of value to regulators and housing rights advocates
in isolation, we also use this list as a portfolio-scale indicator in
our broader analytic approach. The indicator is the percent of buildings
in a portfolio that is suspected of misreporting the number of rent
stabilized units, and the baseline for comparison is the percent of
buildings in NYC with rent stabilized units that appear on the list.

\section{Appendix B: Case Study}

\textbf{Introduction}

In attempting to validate the value of our analysis for uncovering
previously unknown or under-reported instances of landlord intimidation,
our team conducted analyses based on the portfolios of several CUSP
students' landlords. While most of these portfolios did not seem to
indicate a significant amount of harassment across the various
dimensions we analyzed, one portfolio did stand out. After the analyses
were completed and our team determined that this portfolio seemed to
have signs of landlord intimidation, we were able to determine through a
quick internet search that the landlord of the portfolio in question was
indeed a landlord with a history of tenant harassment who was at one
point in the past few years featured in a New York Times report on
tenant harassment. This finding is an anecdotal demonstration of how our
analysis can be used to uncover instances of landlord intimidation
unknown to those using it.

\textbf{~Property Identification}

-Renovation Index score significantly above the city-wide mean of 25.

-10\% of units in the CUSP student's portfolio are rent stabilized as of
2016, 14 percentage points lower than the citywide baseline of 24\%.

-Rent stabilized units (RSU) declined by 70\% from 2007 to 2016,
dramatically higher than the city-wide baseline of 1.9\%.~

~This information suggests that many buildings in this portfolio are in
areas that are seeing more new development and a higher pace of
gentrification (i.e. strong financial incentive to deregulate RSU). In
addition to this, the units in this portfolio have already start
experimenting deregulation, leaving it with a lower \% of RSU.~

\textbf{Property Financing}

- 37\% of buildings in this portfolio received at least one loan from
one of the eight banks known to support the practices of predatory
equity (against a 2\% city-wide baseline)

- One of the buildings in this landlord's portfolio appeared on our list
of properties advertised on StreetEasy. Given that the total number of
buildings on this list is around 1000, even one building is a
substantial red flag of predatory equity.

This fact along with the significantly high percent of buildings in this
portfolio related to banks known to facilitate predatory equity suggest
a landlord utilizing predatory equity as a financial strategy

\textbf{Construction}

-DOB construction complaint counts much higher than the city average:
20\% of buildings had more than the city average plus two standard
deviation.

-DOB complaints over-represented in the Croman and Kushner portfolios:
25\% of buildings had more than the city average plus two standard
deviation.~

These rates are some of the highest out of all the portfolios we
examined. At best it is an indication that this landlord engages in
construction and other building ownership practices that are illegal and
harmful; at worst it is an indication that the landlord uses illegal and
predatory strategies around construction and building ownership as part
of a larger scheme to coerce tenants out of their units.

\textbf{~Legal Proceedings}

- 45\% of buildings in the portfolio have at least one eviction on
record between 2013 and 2015, compared to just 5\% of all residential
buildings citywide.

-The ratio of evictions per unit for the portfolio is .23, one standard
deviation greater than the city-wide average.

While the motivation of these evictions cannot be determined with
certainty solely based on these statistics, the significant differences
to the citywide baseline suggest some underlying mechanism or incentive
to motivate this.

\textbf{Illegal Deregulation}

- 8\% of buildings in the portfolio of the CUSP student's landlord are
on the list of buildings suspected of illegal deregulation through the
misreporting of rent stabilized units. This is about half the rate of
appearance of all rent stabilized buildings in New York City on this
list (16\%).

This does suggest that, while illegal deregulation may have been
conducted by this landlord, it is not necessarily a practice done
systematically across the portfolio.

\textbf{Discussion}

Across almost every dimension of predatory landlord behavior analyzed,
the landlord of the anonymous CUSP student seems significantly more
likely to be engaged in wrong-doing than the average landlord. The
motive for predatory behavior is established through the presence of
buildings in neighborhoods with high rates of development (as proxy for
gentrification and high market rents), the reliance on banks known to
support predatory equity investors for loans, and the purchase of a
building listed using coded language to suggest a predatory equity
opportunity. All these facts point to an underlying financial incentive
scheme reliant on the conversion of rent stabilized units to market
rate. The precipitous drop in rent-stabilized units over the past
decade, the substantially large number of DOB complaints, and a high
rate of eviction all indicate that this landlord uses the tactics of
eviction without just cause and construction-as-harassment to coerce
rent-stabilized tenants out of their units, enabling them to convert
these units to market rate and complete their predatory equity scheme.~

While not every portfolio we tested had a set of indicators that clearly
seemed to indicate a certain type of landlord (good or bad),~this
example does demonstrate the way our analysis can be used to generate an
intuition about a previously unknown landlord's financial motives and
likelihood of engaging in predatory behavior towards their tenants.

\section{References}

Allegations that Kushner Companies falsified DOB paperwork lead to AG
scrutiny. URL.~Accessed on Sat, April 28, 2018. ~

ANHD. ``2017 How Is Affordable Housing Threatened in Your
Neighborhood?'' \emph{ANHD 2016}, ANHD 2016, 2017.

ANHD. ``2018 How Is Affordable Housing Threatened in Your
Neighborhood?'' \emph{ANHD 2016}, ANHD 2016, 2018.

ANHD. ``Sub-Prime-Loan-Crisis-in-Ny-Apt-Hsg.pdf.'' ANHD, Oct. 2008.

~

Bagli, Charles V. ``Kushners Sought to Oust Rent-Regulated Tenants, Suit
Says.'' \emph{The New York Times}, The New York Times, 16 July 2018.

~

Barker, Kim. ``Behind New York's Housing Crisis: Weakened Laws and
Fragmented Regulation.'' \emph{The New York Times}, The New York Times,
20 May 2018.

Brenzel, Kathryn. ``BK Landlords Agree to Pay \$132K for Breaking Tenant
Buyout Rules.''~\emph{The Real Deal}, The Real Deal, 3 Jan. 2018.

\par\null

CoreData.nyc - Furman Center. URL. Accessed on Sat, July 14, 2018.

Freeman, Lance. ``Displacement or Succession?'' \emph{Urban Affairs
Review}, vol. 40, no. 4, 2005, pp. 463--491.,
doi:10.1177/1078087404273341.

~

Furman Center. ``Part\_1\_Gentrification\_SOCin2015\_9JUNE2016.Pdf.''
Furman Center, June 2016.

\par\null

Hall, Miriam. ``Council Considers Monitoring so-Called Predatory
Landlords.'' \emph{The Real Deal}, The Real Deal, 15 Feb. 2018.

Hall, Miriam. ``Bronx Landlord Allegedly Overcharged on Rents despite
Scoring \$3M in Tax Breaks.'' \emph{The Real Deal}, The Real Deal, 25
Jan. 2018.

Newman, Kathe, and Elvin K. Wyly. ``The Right to Stay Put, Revisited:
Gentrification and Resistance to Displacement in New York City.''
\emph{Urban Studies}, vol. 43, no. 1, 2006, pp. 23--57.,
doi:10.1080/00420980500388710.

Nonko, Emily. ``Notorious Landlord Steve Croman to Pay a Record \$8M to
Tenants.'' \emph{Curbed NY}, Curbed NY, 21 Dec. 2017.

\par\null

PA James Unveils the Money Behind New York's Worst Landlords. Accessed
on Sun, July 15, 2018. ~

Parker, Will. ``An Insider's Guide to Evicting Rent-Stabilized
Tenants.'' \emph{The Real Deal}, The Real Deal, 16 Jan. 2018.

~

Parker, Will. ``Kushner Companies Hit with Rent-Stabilization Lawsuit in
Brooklyn Heights.'' \emph{The Real Deal}, The Real Deal, 25 Jan. 2018.

Parker, Will. ``Kushner Companies Hit with Second Rent Stabilization
Suit in Brooklyn.'' \emph{The Real Deal}, The Real Deal, 25 Jan. 2018.

Parker, Will. ``Rudd Realty Agrees to Bring West Village Apartments Back
into Rent Stabilization.'' \emph{The Real Deal}, The Real Deal, 25 Jan.
2018.

\par\null

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\par\null

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