The scenario is symmetric, the expected value of trying to win is \(0.5(-1)+0.5(3)=1\), the expected value of tying is \(0.5(1)+0.5(1)=1\), and the expected value of competing is \(0.25(1)+0.25(1)+0.25(-1)+0.25(3)=1\), thus companies A and B should be indifferent between trying to win and tying. Given this it seems it should be easy to convince both companies that they should cooperate for a tie and coordinate their efforts so that they can focus on safety, but this immediately creates a game where each company must choose whether to honestly cooperate or pretend to cooperate and race in secret \citep*{schelling1981}. If both race or both cooperate their expected values remain \(1\), but if one races and the other cooperates then the racer stands to win at the expense of the cooperator. The payout matrix for this game is given in Table \ref{tab_game_round_2}.